

REVIEW/RESEARCH ARTICLE/SHORT COMMUNICATION

Synergistic strategy of ministries and institutions in anticipation of u.s.-china rivalry in the South China Sea (National Security Stability Development Study)

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Abstract

The international community is very aware that the existence of the South China Sea has a very important and strategic meaning. Conflicts in the disputed South China Sea have the potential to pose a threat to national and regional security. China's aggressive territorial claims in the South China Sea continue to be a source of political strife and military conflict across Asia-Pacific. The active participation of the Indonesian government in the ongoing conflict in the South China Sea is highly expected. Indonesia does not only function as a mediator state but is also expected to be an active country to prevent the outbreak of wider conflicts in the region. Indonesia needs the right strategy in anticipating competition between the United States and China in the South China Sea. This study aims to form a strategic plan of Ministries/Agencies in anticipating competition in the South China Sea for the development of safeguarding national security stability. This study uses a descriptive qualitative method, which this approach is an open reflexive approach, with data collection, development of theoretical concepts, and literature review taking place in a cyclical-continuous process. Data collection techniques through observation (observations), field notes, interviews, documentation studies, and triangulation. Data processing using Nvivo and Soft Systems Methodology (SSM). Based on the data collected, the researcher concludes that the synergy between Ministries/Agencies still needs to be improved. Researchers provide a number of options that can be taken by stakeholders as an alternative, namely by forming a Task Force, which consists of 3 Task Groups, each of which has 3 Task Units. Later the Task Force will be chaired by the Kemenkopolkam and tasked with handling conflict issues in the South China Sea.

Keywords: Strategy, Synergy, Ministries/Agencies, South China Sea

Introduction

The security and defense of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia as contained in the basis of the state, namely in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in the opening paragraph is delegated to all citizens. "... and the struggle for the Indonesian independence movement has arrived at a happy moment in safely bringing the Indonesian people to the front gate of the independence of an independent, united, sovereign, just and prosperous Indonesian state."

In fact, currently, the condition of holding accountability for state defense and security tends to be borne only by institutions in the field of defense, awareness of state defense as stated in the 1945 Constitution has not been carried out optimally by all levels of government and society (Al Syahrin, 2018). So that national defense has not been maximally carried out, because the concept of universal defense adopted by Indonesia has not been maximally supported by all parties.

Threats to the stability of national security today are very complex. Threat aspects are increasingly complex with vulnerability dynamics that are increasingly difficult to predict. The policy of implementing state defense is a guideline in preparing a national defense to maintain state sovereignty, territorial integrity, protect the entire nation, as well as provide a sense of security for all citizens.

The sovereignty of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is currently being tested with various threats, one of which can be triggered by the large number of unresolved territorial boundaries resulting in

conflicts with neighboring countries. Even though Indonesia has ratified the 1982 international convention UNCLOS, and as evidence of the existence of an archipelagic state with exclusive rights, in line with that, Indonesia is very vulnerable to its sovereignty.

An understanding of the dynamics of the strategic environment is an important factor in the formulation of national defense policies and strategies in order to support government policies. The challenges that exist in the 21st century or the dynamics of the global strategic environment, in this case, include military threats, non-military threats, and challenges related to the Indonesian nation. The built Sishankamrata needs to be strengthened to face various forms of threats in the 21st century.

Military threats in the dynamics of the global strategic environment include: related to security in the Asia Pacific; the South China Sea issue; military threats as a continuation of the US-China rivalry issue; competition for the modernization of military power; intra and international conflicts. Meanwhile, non-military threats include the Covid-19 pandemic; foreign fighters returning from terrorism; contemporary threats; development of the fields of Chemistry, Biology, Radiology, Nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE); cybercrime; natural disasters; and food and energy security (Al Syahrin, 2018). The Indonesian government needs to anticipate this threat early on. The Ministry of Defense and the TNI in this case will not be able to act optimally without the participation and support of the relevant Ministries and Institutions.

The active participation of the Indonesian government in the ongoing conflict in the South China Sea is highly expected. Indonesia does not only function as a mediator state but is also expected to be an active country to prevent the activities of the Bamboo Curtain country which aims to expand its jurisdiction area unilaterally. One of the bases for increasing defense strengthening is diplomacy, which is the wisest way to resolve conflicts in the South China Sea. In addition, internally, the Indonesian government must also protect its combat fleet at sea, land, and air in order to maintain the sovereignty of the outermost waters and islands. Sometimes this can lead to clashes or physical conflicts between countries. (Haryanto & Darmawan, 2017).

In early 2021, the Chinese government passed a law allowing the Chinese Coast Guard to shoot down foreign vessels protecting areas of the South China Sea that China claims as "traditional fishing zones" based on the "nine-dash line". China's aggressiveness in the South China Sea has become a new concern.

While its rival, the United States, is not standing still, the United States which is "rebalancing" Asia must further assert its military superiority in the South China Sea by continuing to engage and take advantage of regional security cooperation agreements and competition among ASEAN members to counter China. This is evidenced by the recent US-ASEAN joint maritime exercise, in which the United States conducted joint exercises involving the militaries of Thailand, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam. This exercise is especially important because China's claims in the South China Sea overlap with those of the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Brunei. In addition, the navies of China, the United States, and Japan as well as Southeast Asian countries regularly operate in disputed waters (Jhonson, 2019).

Nicky C. Cardenas (2020) in his research said the impact of military competition between the United States and China in the South China Sea in relation to Southeast Asian security. In particular, it focuses on the implications of China's continued modern militarization of the South China Sea, as evidenced by its construction of military installations on artificial islands and reefs. Conflicts over freedom of navigation and militarization between the United States and China in strategic waters where Southeast Asian navies operate have increased tensions and jeopardized ASEAN's role in regional peace and security. In addition, China's

overlapping claims to the Paracel and Spratly Islands have jeopardized the safety and security of the ASEAN Community, especially as China has become more aggressive in its claims to Taiwan.

Thus, conflicts in the South China Sea dispute area have the potential to be a threat to regional and national security, for some reasons including: first, this dispute involves several countries in the Southeast Asia and East Asia Region, namely: Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei Darussalam, Taiwan, and China; Second, countries that claim in the South China Sea area do not hesitate to use military equipment such as warships to the area to support their claim of rights to their jurisdictions; Third, it is not only the claimant countries that are in conflict, but the big countries that feel that their national interests are disturbed are participating in the conflict; Fourth, until now there is no or no political instrument that can be used to resolve conflicts in the South China Sea.

The new concept implemented by China is the Blue Sea Campaign 2020 regarding law enforcement in the South China Sea from April 1 to November 29, 2020, which presents task forces namely aircraft carriers, destroyers, and coast guard vessels as well as the establishment of two new districts in the South China Sea, namely Xisha and Sansha on April 18, 2020. China will uphold its sovereignty and laws and crackdown on exploration and exploitation activities deemed wrong by China. China will also do whatever it takes to defend and safeguard its sovereignty, rights, and interests in the South China Sea. On the other hand, the impact of the American Freedom of Navigation campaign which presents a task force, namely aircraft carriers, and destroyers, opens the possibility of conflict between the two major powers in the South China Sea.

In general, the conflict of interest between the US and China in the South China Sea is not new. Napoleon once predicted the rise of China, "Two centuries ago Napoleon predicted the rise of China. Napoleon was warned that the rise of China would shake the world. Once he stated: "Let China sleep, for when she wakes, she will shake the world" (Boyle, 2004). Global war will not take place, because both states are nuclear powers and have the capacity to destroy the world" (Valdai Club, 2016).

The influence of the dynamics of the conflict in the South China Sea strongly influences the process of handling and resolving the conflict itself. The conflict is a threat and a challenge to regional security stability, and Indonesia is no exception, which declares it is not a claimant country and does not recognize China's "Nine dotted lines" unilateral claim.

However, Indonesia does not want to be directly involved in the South China Sea conflict, but efforts to take part in handling the conflict continue. Because according to the mandate of the constitution, Indonesia has a responsibility to create world peace. Until now, the Indonesian government cannot remain silent seeing the enthusiasm of America and China to compete in the South China Sea, the arms and warship races are taking place there. This seriously threatens the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Indonesia. Addressing this problem is of course not only a problem for the security forces but must be considered comprehensively in a higher concept because the impact of these activities threatens Indonesia's national security. This is the shared responsibility of all levels of government and the people of Indonesia. Until now, there is no clause in the Strategic Plan document at the Ministry/Agency that discusses the anticipation of this problem. This is possible because of the assumption that defense affairs are the responsibility of the TNI and the Ministry of Defense. Until now, there is no strategy to anticipate competition between the US and China in the South China Sea in the relevant Ministries/Agencies, and its implementation has not been integrated between national components.

The weakness of the state defense system and domestic security system, whether structural, procedural, or substantial, is the dominant factor in the decline in the ability of actors to deal with threats that arise from

state threats. Several articles related to the regulation of the defense and security system in Indonesia were found to be the cause of the problem. Due to the interrelationships between the defense and security sectors, which are the duties and responsibilities of the TNI and Polri, accountability between the TNI and Polri is required. However, the clear relationship between the TNI and Polri has not been regulated in the regulations. In the context of Indonesian defense and security, it is necessary to formulate a clear relationship between the TNI and Polri in the defense and security system. (Ministry of Defense, 2015b)

The concept of national security is currently felt there are still doubts/ambiguous in the authority and duties and organization, especially among the security forces of the TNI/Polri. The current security stability is vulnerable due to disputes, disputes, conflicts that are strengthened and will result in war. Lack of early detection from the government in the issue of the US-China military power race and competition in the South China Sea threatens the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and safety of the Indonesian nation. (Defense, 2013)

The above conditions have many shortcomings, especially in terms of coordination and synergy between Ministries/Agencies and related institutions, each agency only prioritizes sectoral interests. Indonesia's weakness in coordination and synergy can be easily exploited by countries that want to intervene in Indonesia. This is a real threat to the integrity and sovereignty of the nation. Based on the needs, the development of threats, and the development of the strategic environment, the implementation of national security safeguards by existing components requires software and hardware upgrades for the preparation of a comprehensive national security system. In realizing a conducive and comprehensive national security, it is not only the responsibility of the TNI and Polri as the main force, but also involves the relevant government agencies and the role of the community as mandated in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.

Efforts to realize national security can no longer stand-alone, meaning that defining the concept of national security cannot only be limited to traditional meanings that are only oriented to state defense and security tools. However, national security must be seen as an integral part of various aspects of the life of the nation and state, namely ideology, politics, economy, social, culture, defense, and state security. Sectoral ego in Ministries/Institutions is seen when solving an uncoordinated problem.

Following up on the military power competition and the US-China competition in the South China Sea by defining the strategy in two ways: Conceptually, we define the institutional synergy strategy as the relationship between the means and means in dealing with the US-China competition in the South China Sea, with the aim of maintaining national security stability. The strategic art of the synergy of Ministries/Agencies is broadly defined that the synergy of Ministries/Agencies is the formulation of coordination between Ministries/Agencies, and the implementation of Ends (goals) as the end of Development of National Security Stability Maintenance, the way is the synergy of Ministries/Institutions, and facilities (resources) to safeguard the interests of national security stability.

Based on the problems above, researchers are interested in taking the title "Synergy Strategy of Ministries/Institutions in Anticipating America-China Competition in the South China Sea (Study on Development of National Security Stability)"

Research Methods

The research method in this study is a qualitative research method with a descriptive approach. Qualitative research starts from grounded theory because this approach is an open reflexive approach, in which data collection, development of theoretical concepts, and literature review take place in a cyclical-continuous process.

The steps of the grounded theory research model follow the general qualitative pattern. After the research, the theoretical concepts compiled are re-examined which need to be revised or refined through various revisions and improvements or refinements, using accurate data through comparative analysis (comparative research) and situations, as well as appropriate groups to test or find theories. The research paradigm chosen for this dissertation is Post Positivism.

Results and Discussion

Strategy is a functional need for every human being because everything is political, community needs security which must involve efforts to match political goals with available means well enough to be used in a fairly effective way. (Gray.s. Colin, 2014:3)

Therefore, the real goal of the strategy is not to seek a lot of battles but to find situations that are very favorable for him in making decisions. The approach formulated by Basil Liddell Hart here is an indirect approach because attacking the enemy directly is a detrimental approach and almost never produces results (Hart, 1991).

In determining the national defense strategy, there are three main domains, namely: ends, means, and ways. (Erbel & Kinsey, 2018; Milevski, 2016).

Means

Are various resources owned by owners/policymakers, which are used as entities or assets based on the chosen strategy? The existence, selection, and deployment of these resources are highly dependent on the formulation of the strategy adopted.

The superpower (US) state defense strategy perspective states "A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives." This understanding describes the strategic perspective of defense to mobilize all instruments of national power to achieve national goals. (US Joint Publications, 2017).

In early 2021, the Chinese government passed a law allowing the Chinese Coast Guard to shoot down foreign vessels protecting areas of the South China Sea that China claims as "traditional fishing zones" based on the "nine-dash line". dash line)". China's aggressiveness in the South China Sea has become a new concern. The Chinese government also took a new step to strengthen its position in the South China Sea, Beijing issued a new maritime law that has the power to deter or deny entry of ships into Chinese waters if they are found to pose a threat to China's national security.

China's Maritime Law was enacted based on the Presidential Regulation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) issued by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress No. 79 dated April 29, 2021, on the Revision of the Maritime Traffic Safety Act. The law, which originally consisted of 12 chapters and 53 articles, was revised into 10 chapters and 122 articles, which stipulates 5 main points and is declared to be effective since September 1, 2021.

The implementation of the revised law is possible as a platform for China to always be present in its Nine-Dash Line (NDL) claim area in order to exercise full territorial control, under the pretext of inspection and

emergency rescue of ships sailing in the South China Sea. With the enactment of the new Navigational Safety Act, it is very possible that the presence of the Chinese Patrol fleet in the SCS will dominate law enforcement in its jurisdiction and require that all flag state vessels navigating in the SCS must have China's approval/permission. The issuance of the Revised Law is expected to be a long-term readiness, assuming that China is very optimistic about winning its Nine-Dash Line territorial claim in the future. In the future, the ships that must continue to report their position are submarines, nuclear ships, ships carrying radioactive materials, as well as tankers, chemicals, liquefied gas, and hazardous substances.

China's aggressive territorial claims in the South China Sea continue to be a source of political strife and military conflict across Asia-Pacific, with the rules of engagement largely dictated by China, calling for non-US military intervention. Stephen Burgess points out the many consequences of the "low-level conflict" between China and Vietnam during the Battle of the Paracels in 1974 and subsequent disputes in the South China Sea in 1979, 1988, and 2014. In a 2019 interview with US Embassy officials in Hanoi, Burgess noted that because the "strategic partnership" between Vietnam and the United States currently has boundaries, Vietnam must continue to face China in the Paracels and Spratlys almost alone. (Burgess, 2020)

This tension has been exacerbated by the ongoing trade war between the two countries. Taking into account the ongoing tensions in the South China Sea, open conflict between the two superpowers could happen at any time.

The power possessed by each country is different, for there needs to be a balance between the power possessed by each country which is called the "balance of power". Ernest Hans assumes four prerequisites for the existence of a balance of power system, namely: 1) The multiplicity of sovereign political actors, which arises because there is no one authority that controls these actors; 2) the relatively unbalanced distribution of power among the political actors that make up the system; 3) continuous competition and conflict among sovereign political actors; 4) the implicit understanding among the leaders of the great nations that the continued distribution of power will benefit them.

So far, the United States and its allies are preparing various countermeasures against China's domination strategy in the South China Sea, one of which is increasing the frequency of America's Freedom of Navigation Operator (FONOPS) and access to patrols by other Indo-Pacific powers from Britain and France headed to India, Japan, and Australia. America claims that the operation they are holding is a legitimate operation and does not violate the rules of international law.

The competition between the US and China in the South China Sea has implications for national security conditions even though Indonesia is neutral and avoids taking sides with one party. Competition between great powers and their influence in the region has increased the potential for division and distrust among countries around the South China Sea. As a result, the distrust and disintegration between ASEAN countries increase the risk of regional security stability, while the great powers continue to expand their influence. The US-China rivalry reduces the strategic value of regional orders built by ASEAN countries, especially on stability in the South China Sea. In addition, it also hinders the implementation of Indonesia's strategic vision in building national security with a maritime axis. Because in essence, Indonesia's national security cannot be separated from regional security conditions where the South China Sea is the central area.

The prediction of competition between the US and China in the South China Sea cannot be separated from the domestic factors of the two superpowers. The Chinese government is consistent with its stance in claiming the right to the nine-dash-line in the South China Sea while expanding the economic market in the ASEAN region. Meanwhile, on the US side, the transition of a new government still leaves tensions that have

not subsided. Both the US and China have established relations with a number of ASEAN countries that have overlapping claims to the South China Sea. However, the military maneuvers carried out by both parties still create a security dilemma in the region.

In the midst of China's incessant efforts to demonstrate dominance in the South China Sea, the United States, Britain, and Australia agreed to a trilateral cooperation agreement with AUKUS. The AUKUS Pact is a trilateral security agreement between the United States, Britain, and Australia that can be seen as a new effort to reduce China's military influence in the Indo-Pacific region, although the three countries did not mention China in their pact. US President Joe Biden said the new defense pact would help Australia acquire nuclear-powered submarine technology and other military cooperation. This situation allows the Australian navy to keep pace with Chinese nuclear-powered vessels in the Asia-Pacific region. There is growing concern that the AUKUS Pact could create new conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region, and even pose the risk of nuclear war.

The current state of Indonesia's national security is closely related and has a strong influence on the US-China competitive conflict in the South China Sea. The geographical constellation of Indonesia is the largest archipelagic country in the world with 17,504 islands with natural resources contained therein, a coastline of 108,000 km, and a strategic location between two continents and two oceans, including the presence of four of the world's nine choke points and sea line of communication (SLOC) and sea line of oil trade (SLOT), placing Indonesia in a strategic position in the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region. Under these conditions, the instability of security conditions in the region due to conflicts or big power competition, directly or indirectly, will have an impact on the conditions of national stability and security.

Indonesia's foreign policy in the South China Sea is trying to move the enabling environment to engage in dialogue, encouraging increased economic cooperation in the region, RI must maintain a free and active foreign policy and law enforcement in the ZEEI to protect Indonesia's sovereign rights. As a key country in the region, Indonesia must take full advantage of its position as optimally as possible in order to protect its national interests while at the same time playing its strategic role appropriately in dealing with the issue of great power competition in the region, either through diplomacy within a bilateral framework or utilizing multilateral forums such as ASEAN or other cooperation frameworks. This is because conditions in the South China Sea will have an impact on Indonesia's interests, such as sovereignty interests, political interests, national defense and security interests, economic interests, and socio-cultural interests.

Ways

Is the method or strategy chosen to achieve the end result defined by the policy in question? There are various options available, so a systematic and methodological step must be carried out to get the best strategy.

Indonesia is not one of the countries that claim direct ownership of the South China Sea. However, geographical factors and international political factors are indicators of Indonesia's interest in the South China Sea. Based on geographical importance, the Indonesian sea area which is directly adjacent to the South China Sea indicates a strategic position for the two waters. Security stability in the South China Sea has implications for Indonesia's territorial sovereignty, especially in the Natuna Sea. Considering that Indonesia also needs to maintain and protect the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), all forms of aggressive actions from outsiders in the South China Sea region should be considered for national security and territorial sovereignty. From an economic point of view, SCS is an important area for Indonesia's export-import activities through

sea trade. Meanwhile, in terms of international politics, Indonesia's position as a central actor in ASEAN encourages Indonesia to have an interest in taking part in SCS issues.

Basically, Indonesia's strategic location which is directly adjacent to the South China Sea provides a natural geostrategic advantage, so that at the beginning of the reign of President Joko Widodo, Indonesia had the vision to become a Global Maritime Axis by building geo-economic and geopolitical strength originating from the sea. The government realizes that in the future, Indonesia must maximize the utilization of marine resources as a source of the national economy. Moreover, stability in the South China Sea has an impact on the security and smoothness of sea trade routes for Indonesia and ASEAN.

After the LCS Arbitration Award is issued, Indonesia's statement is:

- 1) Encourage all parties to refrain from escalating tensions, protect Southeast Asia from military activities that could threaten stability and peace, and respect international law including UNCLOS;
- 2) Requesting all Parties to continue their joint commitment to maintaining peace and showing a sense of friendship and cooperation;
- 3) Indonesia will continue to encourage the establishment of the Southeast Asian region as a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality to strengthen the ASEAN Political and Security Community
- 4) Encouraging all claimant States to continue peace negotiations on overlapping claims regarding sovereignty in the South China Sea in accordance with international law.

So far, Indonesia has refused to compromise the status of the SCS bilaterally with China. Indonesia's attitude towards issues in the South China Sea is to adhere to the 1982 UNCLOS as a reference for the international law of the sea in its foreign policy, in which the unilateral claim of China's nine-dash line does not have a valid legal basis, cannot be accepted, and cannot be recognized. However, this also does not mean that Indonesia is apathetic and sided with the other party. Indonesia, based on the order and mechanism of international relations, seeks to encourage conflicts to be managed peacefully in order to achieve the best solution for the interests of maintaining stability and peace, and mutual prosperity in the region.

Anticipating the potential for conflict escalation in the South China Sea, Indonesia can also be guided by the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (1994), especially chapter II part I point 16, namely as a neutral country (not taking sides) must be able to maintain its waters and jurisdiction. so as not to be used by one of the conflicting parties. This is related to Indonesia's geostrategy to anticipate conflict escalation that has the potential to culminate due to competition in the interests of the great powers in the region. Indonesia must protect its jurisdiction from being used for the purposes and interests of other conflicting parties and prevent the excesses of the conflict itself from affecting Indonesia's national interests.

The target in diplomatic efforts at the ASEAN Plus level is the agreement on the Code of Conduct (COC) as a binding international legal product. It can be concluded that the achievement target in anticipating the US-China competition requires synergy between institutions, both at the domestic and multilateral levels.

The Indonesian government prioritizes the agenda of strengthening maritime security and border areas considering the conflictual conditions in the South China Sea. This target is pursued by optimizing the development of the defense sector in Natuna, which is included in the 3T (Lagged, Foremost, Outermost) area. Physical development is marked by the opening of dock and flight facilities in the Natuna area as a form of prevention and self-defense from threats. Non-physical development in the form of counseling or

education to defend the state to the Natuna community is also important to carry out. The participation of the community, especially those who make a living as fishermen around the Natuna Sea, is needed to assist the TNI and Bakamla in carrying out their duties as the main component of maritime security and border areas.

The resources that need to be increased for the development of national security stability are human resources, information technology, and defense equipment. Human resources are a central factor that relies on the totality of ability/professionalism and awareness of defending the state of every citizen for the benefit of national defense. The development of national defense human resources capabilities is carried out in order to manage and utilize all national resources to deal with every threat. Improving information technology infrastructure can improve the ability to monitor information about existing threats quickly and integrated with the center as an effort to increase early detection of threats.

In addition, modernization of defense equipment is also needed as a defensive defense effort against potential conflicts that are bigger and threaten Indonesia. The modernization of defense forces, especially in the maritime sector, can anticipate the possibility of conflict escalation due to the uncertainty of the current strategic situation in the South China Sea. This increase in resources can support the strategic plans of Ministries/Agencies in the development of national security stability.

Ends

It is the goal to be achieved from the existence of a policy, the formulation of this policy objective will be largely determined by many factors, both internal and external from a country

The factor that affects the synergy of ministries/agencies in anticipating competition between the United States and China in the South China Sea is that the actual threat posed is increasingly real and clearly threatening the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia, especially in the North Natuna Sea which is adjacent to the South China Sea. So that it encourages the urgency of collaboration between ministries/agencies to maintain the national interest, namely the security and stability of Indonesia.

However, in its implementation, there are often institutional obstacles that can affect the synergy of ministries/agencies. For example, budget constraints and lengthy bureaucratic processes in each ministry/institution in following up on policies have become internal obstacles to the implementation of foreign cooperation and the resolution of problems in the field of foreign policy.

In a study conducted by Najiyati and Rahmat (2018), they define synergy as a combination or combination of elements or parts that can produce better and larger outputs. Synergy can be understood as a combined operation or a combination of elements to produce a better output.

From the conditions described above, the role played by Indonesia and the functions of ministries/agencies in anticipating the US-China competition in the South China Sea;

- a. Diplomacy: streamlining the role of Diplomacy, carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for the creation and maintenance of stability, security, and peace in the South China Sea region, with the direction of enforcing the COC (Code of Conduct), for countries in conflict;
- b. Defense and security; Improving the defense and security facilities and infrastructure of the area which is the sovereign territory of the Indonesian State, in anticipating escalation

in the South China Sea area, and securing and maintaining the sovereign territory of the Indonesian state and natural resources which are still the right to manage the sovereignty of the Indonesian state, the EEZ (Economy Exclusive Zone).

- c. Program Synchronization and Synergy of Ministries/Institutions Social Social Aspects of Community: Program Synchronization and Synergy carried out by Ministries/Agencies from the Aspect of Improvement and Socio-Economic Empowerment of Communities in the South China Sea (LCS) area, including in facilitating infrastructure support for socio-economic activities and maintain the security and safety of Indonesian citizens who are carrying out activities in the region, so that the North Natuna Sea becomes a new base for the Geostrategy, Geopolitics, and Geoeconomics of the Republic of Indonesia.

From this information, it was conveyed that in planning a defense strategy in dealing with threats to national security and sovereignty, it is necessary to have comprehensive coordination of all aspects, be it political, economic, social, and diplomatic, not just military considerations. Although in reality in the current defense strategy planning, only think about the military. Therefore, to make a reliable defense strategy, the government in this case the Ministry of Defense must coordinate with other Ministries to obtain recommendations for defense strategy planning policies. Defense strategy planning can use an approach and is explained in three principle concepts that require cooperation, namely strategy, politics, history, where all three have their respective functions.

The view of the synergy of ministries/agencies as part of carrying out the consolidation of all institutional components so that they are ready to face a threat from other countries, increasing national defense is important by involving all state institutions to work together to help if there is a threat from outside, such as the conflict in the China Sea. south which also makes a big impact on Indonesia which is adjacent to the island of Natuna. The synergistic and constructive partnership between governance components is built from several hypothetical propositions as follows:

1. A synergistic and constructive partnership determines the accuracy of the identification of needs;
2. Partnerships between governance components that synergize determine the effectiveness of the preparation for the implementation of the cooperation stages;
3. a synergistic and constructive partnership determines the transparency, accountability, and certainty of the implementation of the formation of the defense industry;
4. partnership in-service evaluation determines productivity, quality, and competitiveness. the impact that will be generated through the synergy in the defense industry to the relevant agencies.

Based on the pattern of working relationships that may occur, it will produce three characteristics of communication in the collaboration. First; Defensive, namely the level of cooperation and low trust will result in a passive defensive communication pattern. At the level of passive-defensive communication, ie the absence of communication and relationships between related parties does not produce energy of optimal cooperation, concern, and dynamic coordination that has an impact on progress in an organization or region. (Sulistyaningtyas, 2017:105).

In addition, there are still sectoral egos between ministries/agencies that become obstacles in coordination and synchronization in responding to the challenges of security threats in the region as well as in developing

bilateral and regional cooperation in the fields of politics, law, and security with countries in the region. These are factors that can affect the synergy of ministries/agencies.

Policies from policymakers and strategy derivatives from strategy makers have not been optimally harmonized. The Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs and the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs as policymakers are not yet aligned, each has policy guidelines that do not strengthen the other. Recommendations to formulate harmonization of Indonesian policies are not just to combine two policies, but to re-evaluate the two policies from policymakers related to SCS issues and measure which policies will be implemented with a time scale. Then from the policies at the ministry/agency level under the two coordinating ministries that have been harmonized, a ministry/institution strategy can be drawn up that supports the realization of the national strategy in accordance with its strategic field and environment.

In addition to the budget factor in the synergy of ministries and institutions, the cause of the weakening of supervision in the sea area is the absence of institutional synergy that has the authority to carry out surveillance at sea. This condition has been going on for years and shows no improvement. The absence of synergy between the competent authorities can actually be overcome if there is an intention from each relevant institution to make improvements through planning for surveillance at sea.

Steps to improve the synergy between institutions is to carry out budget synergies between ministries/government agencies authorized to carry out surveillance at sea. This is considered to accelerate the synergy process and create an even better supervisory performance. The strategy of a synergy of supervision at sea between ministries/agencies authorized to oversee the sea is the key to improving surveillance performance while at sea. Several focuses in overcoming obstacles to synergies between institutions, namely: The first focus is to correct the shortcomings of policies that have been made by previous ministers. By first conducting an intensive study of the implementation of the rules, their impact, and what steps need to be corrected by current officials. The second focus is not to be careless in discussing policies based on weak arguments. Because there is a principle of high uncertainty in current fisheries management, so we know what developments are happening in the South China Sea.

TNI Headquarters has carried out several operations in the North Natuna Sea involving the Indonesian Navy (Koarmada I), Indonesian Air Force (Koopsau I), and Kohanudnas. The strategies implemented are divided into short-term strategies, namely Optimizing the degree of Operations according to RO to carry out sea control in LNU; The medium-term strategy is to increase control capabilities in the Natuna waters and increase the ability to take action against violations; and one that is long-term, one of which is increasing the ability of Navy diplomacy (Naval Diplomacy). The strengthening of ground troops on inhabited islands around conflict areas should also be increased.

The strategy and response carried out by the TNI to deal with/anticipate the escalation of conflict in the South China Sea are to hold a Kamla/Combat Alert operation, a Marine Combat Alert Operation under the Control of Kogabwilhan I/Kogasgabpad and make a National Contingency plan related to this. Some of the recommendations submitted by the Aesops Commander of the TNI include:

- a. Continue to carry out a free and active foreign policy
- b. Don't be provoked into taking part in the conflict, unless there is a violation of sovereignty and law in the Indonesian National jurisdiction
- c. Carrying out Joint Operations at LNU

- d. Alerting Indonesian Air Force fighter planes at Raden Sadjat Ranai Air Base, Natuna and Supadio Air Base Pontianak
- e. Addition of TNI budget for strength development, especially the TNI Integrated Base in Natuna (capable of supporting logistics for all types of defense equipment)
- f. Conduct Coordinated Patrols with Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei
- g. Encouraging the Government to build RIG/offshore oil platforms as a form of Positive Occupation and can also function as an advanced base.

Ministries/Institutions that are included in the instruments of Indonesia's maritime power need to unify the vision and mission in order to create synergy in facing the US-China competition. The implementation of strategic synergy can be seen with the following explanations.

- a) The Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs and Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs have the capacity to make national policies, with the aim of harmonizing derivative policies or field policies implemented by other Ministries/Institutions.
- b) Equipped with weapons, the TNI and Bakamla carry out routine patrols within the outer boundaries of Indonesia's territory. In this case, the Indonesian Navy and Bakamla have the capacity to act if there is a Rule of Engagement with a foreign ship. Meanwhile, the KKP patrols the territorial zone up to the EEZ to take action against foreign fishing vessels.
- c) The Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs synergize in pursuing defense diplomacy to build trust (Confidence Building Measure) with other countries. In addition, he is also authorized to explore strategic cooperation to increase defense and security capabilities.

Integrated diplomacy efforts (integrated diplomacy) between related Ministries/Institutions under one roof Kemenko Polhukam RI (Hanneg) or Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs (regional sovereignty) as the Leading Sector, and the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Ministry of Defense or TNI Headquarters as implementing coordinators who coordinate all Ministries Relevant institutions in establishing any form of cooperation between countries that have links to the EEZ in all jurisdictions of Indonesia can anticipate US-China competition in the South China Sea. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense coordinate the three dimensions of the national defense posture, namely the land, sea, and air dimensions in maintaining the stability of national security. The synergy between institutions is needed in the implementation of the strategy to maintain national security stability. The Ministry of Defense, Indonesian Navy, Indonesian Air Force, and the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla) can play a role in increasing intensive guard operations in the Natuna area of Indonesia's territorial security. The Ministry of Defense can create a peace dialogue through defense diplomacy with the state.

Conclusion

The South China Sea conflict is a threat and a challenge to regional security stability, and Indonesia is no exception, which declares itself not as a claimant state and does not recognize China's unilateral claim (Nine dotted lines). The international community is very aware that the existence of the South China Sea has an important and strategic meaning. The active participation of the Indonesian government in the ongoing conflict in the South China Sea is highly expected. Indonesia does not only function as a mediator state but is also expected to be an active country to prevent the activities of the Bamboo Curtain country which aims to expand its jurisdiction area unilaterally.

It is necessary to have good cooperation and diplomacy with regional countries, especially in Southeast Asia, not to mention good bilateral relations with claimant countries, namely China, which must be improved. The current strategy in anticipating competition between the US and China in the South China Sea has not been implemented in an integrated manner between components of the nation, especially related Ministries and Institutions. The synergy between ministries/agencies is currently felt to be very lacking, there are still sectoral egos in each institution as well as overlapping tasks and authorities, each ministry/institution is also still moving independently and not directed so that anticipating the South China Sea conflict cannot be synergized.

For this reason, a synergy strategy is needed which is expected to regulate the synergy of ministries/agencies in anticipating conflicts in the South China Sea in the context of safeguarding national security. The synergy strategy is to create a synergy program at the policy level and will be implemented by a Task Force/Task Force/desk which consists of relevant Ministries/institutions whose task is to implement the synergy strategy that has been made, based on the duties and functions of each Ministry/institution.

This Task Force operates on the directive/directive of the President so that a PERPRES is needed in its implementation. Each Task Group creates a timetable that contains problem identification, solutions that are limited by time strain, and evaluation or review of implementation. The validity period of this Task Force is based on strategic environmental conditions. The program budget is charged to the budget of each ministry/institution so that it is submitted by the ministry/institution according to their respective duties and functions. The Task Force will carry out implementation evaluations every 3 months.

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