

The Evolution Of Indonesian Archipelagic Defence From 1945 To 1990s

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Abstract

As an archipelagic state, Indonesia develops an archipelagic defence it views as the most suitable to its needs. Two primary factors contribute in shaping this defence system: Indonesia's fragmented geography as the largest archipelagic complex situated in one of the most important routes for international trade and navigation and its modern history as an ex-European colony obtaining independence after the World War II. This article discusses how both factors intertwined affecting the evolution of Indonesia's archipelagic defence. With regard to the geographic factor, the legal and political struggle both in domestic and international stage to establish the archipelago doctrine is crucial. As for the historical factor, how Indonesia addresses its post-colonial legacies should be considered. Both factors contribute to how Indonesia formulates its defence policy and how the military organises itself to effectively carry its task in defending the state's archipelagic territory.

Keywords: : archipelagic defence; defence system; post-colonial; fragmented geography; doctrine

Introduction

A nation's defence strategy is heavily shaped by its geography; it goes along with its behaviour from time to time in pursuing its interests and maintaining sovereignty over its defined territory. Geographical conditions such as landscapes, environmental characteristics, area size, and climate greatly determine how troop deployments are carried out, how battles to defend the territory in the event of an invasion are orchestrated, as well as the qualifications of weapons and military vehicles that can be used. Meanwhile, the experience of fighting, waging war, or addressing conflicts in the past also affects how the country's defence is designed. This historical record can also be used to predict how the country will defend its territory and interests in the future in the event of a conflict with other countries.

Thus, it is necessary to properly understand how a nation's defence policy develops in response to its geopolitical environment throughout different eras of its historical journey. That is precisely what this article means to be: an analysis of particular country's defence strategy that takes into account the geographical factor shaped and re-shaped throughout its history, not only as a physical features of its territory but also as a politico-legal entity. As for the case of Indonesia, two factors are crucial to be scrutinized: (1) its geographical features, including its shape as a 'fragmented state' and position in between Asia and Australia continent as well as Indian and Pacific; and (2) its historical context as a nation—among others—claiming independence from Western imperialist powers shortly after the World War II whose struggle to overcome its postcolonial issues and legacies becomes an integral part of its nation-building.

Indonesia's territory has distinct traits and characteristics making its shape peculiar. It is the largest archipelagic state in the world—its archipelagic waters are even greater than all other archipelagic states' waters combined —with extremely diverse population comprised of hundreds of ethnic groups. It is quite fair to characterise Indonesia as 'fragmented,' both in term of its shape and society.

Indonesian archipelago is also situated in a strategic position, a crossing which is arguably the most important waters for international navigation connecting Indian and Pacific oceans especially in three points: Malaka, Sunda, and Ombi-Wetar straits. Its geopolitical significance was also evident during the World War II and the Cold War. In 1940s Indonesian archipelago was fought over by Japan and the Allied forces due to its abundant resources that are crucial for supplying strategic raw materials such as petroleum, rubber, tin, and other metals. During the Cold War of 1950s to early 1960s, the United States (US) desperately held a war in Vietnam to block the communist wave from the north so it wouldn't take over resource-rich Indonesia.

Considering its geographical features as a vast archipelago dominated by waters, at a glance it looks reasonable, then, that Indonesia needs to put more weights on its naval forces and maritime defence. Nonetheless, its widely open border, most of which is at seas, makes such option unfeasible in reality. Also, throughout its modern history Indonesia has always been preoccupied with separatism and the problem of possible national disintegration. Consequently, its experiences in military operations have been dominated by counter-insurgencies measures which are offensive in nature and heavily rely on the army, while the involvement of the navy and the air force tends to be carried out through joint operations. Since 1945 to 2020, Indonesian military conducted 370 military operations—around 63 per cent of them were offensive operations to carry out domestic security tasks.

Departing from such historical experience, the archipelagic state form of Indonesia cannot be taken for granted. In fact, the form of this archipelagic state is something that has been obtained through a long struggle. The construction of Indonesia as an archipelagic state also goes hand in hand with the evolution of Indonesia's defence system to achieve the most suitable and appropriate strategy in dealing with any form of threats. This article aims to discuss how the defence system evolved along with the evolution of the archipelagic doctrine from the time of Indonesia's independence in 1945 to its relatively stable form in the 1990s. Within each phase discussed in the next sections, we will focus on the context of strategic environment, the threats Indonesia has to deal with, the condition and politico-legal status of Indonesian territory, and how it engages the military measures in resolving national security problems.

The Wehrkreise and Incomplete Indonesian Geography during the Independence War (1945–1949)

In 1942 Japan defeated the Dutch and occupied Indonesia for the next three years. Following the defeat of Japan by the Allied force in the Pacific front of the World War II, Indonesia proclaimed its independence in 17 August 1945. Yet, the Dutch didn't recognize its former colony's independence until 2 November 1949, when the Dutch–Indonesian Round Table Conference was signed and the two parties agreed to formally execute a transfer of power from the Dutch to Indonesia's leaders. Shortly after the proclamation of independence, Indonesia had to defend it against the Dutch military aggression. For the matter, Indonesian military employed a strategy called the Wehrkreise or 'military regions,' by which every area, making use of all resources available in its proximity, was expected to be able to fight the enemy independently under their respective regional commander. At the time, Indonesia's territory was considered incomplete and unconsolidated. Some regions were being contested between Indonesia and the Dutch, while some others were still under the occupation of the Dutch.

It didn't take too long since the defeat of Japan in 1945 for Indonesian leaders to sense a danger from the Dutch's apparent desire to re-claim its most valuable colony. The anxiety among Indonesians at the time was reasonable—the newly-born state had only insufficient time to consolidate its government and political

establishment as well as its physical strength in the form of armed forces to anticipate military invasion. However, by the year of 1946 the probable threat of aggression by the Dutch became more and more apparent. Intelligence information collected by Indonesian soldiers and militia-alike informed the government that the Dutch army was already landed in several ports as a part of the Allied forces led by the British, even though most of the Dutch personnel at the time were administrative personnel. Facing the alarming threat, Indonesia suffered from major shortcomings, including an unorganized military. Prior to the time of the first Dutch 'police action'—much later be known among Indonesians as the Dutch Military Aggression I—in the midst of 1947, Indonesian arm struggles were carried out by paramilitary groups (Laskar), each acting independently and lacking coordination. It was these paramilitary groups that in 1945–1946 sporadically disarmed the Japanese soldiers and confiscated their weapons.

At the same time, as a part of the government's policy to prioritize diplomatic efforts in order to obtain international recognition for Indonesia's independence, it decided not to form an armed force. Instead of a proper military forces, in 22 August 1945 it formed the People's Security Body (Badan Keamanan Rakyat [BKR]), a corps tasked with the rehabilitation of war veterans. A regular army, namely the People's Security Army (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat [TKR]), was formed in 5 October 1945 led by Urip Sumohardjo, a former lieutenant commander of KNIL (Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger or the Royal Dutch-Indies Army). Indonesian army underwent several name changings until it became the National Army of Indonesia (Tentara Nasional Indonesia [TNI]) in 3 June 1947, formed by the merging of paramilitary groups (Laskar Rakyat) with the Army of the Republic of Indonesia (Tentara Republik Indonesia, TRI).

By the time the Dutch engaged its first 'police action' (the Dutch Military Aggression I) in 21 July–4 August 1947, officially called Operation Product, then, Indonesia already had an army, but it was short of personnel, weapon, and mobilization ability. During the first years of its formation, Indonesian military (TKR) was organised into four Commandments, namely West Java, Central Java, East Java, and Sumatra Commandments, but the organisation was unable to be implemented effectively. The TKR was poorly consolidated, not enough experience in organising military forces, had only few military educated personnel, was deficient of weapons and ammunitions, and had a finite communication infrastructure to organise scattered forces in numerous islands. It is reasonable, then, for the military leadership to dissolve the Commandment system in 1946 and took the wehrkreise strategy onwards, by which each military unit should be able to independently operate to defend their respective region from the Dutch invasion. The strategy was geared with guerrilla warfare in the hope that the prolonged war will drain enemy's resources and eventually create a chance for an offensive in return.

Beside those organisational shortcomings, there were also strategic and political reasons to adopt the wehrkreise. Strategically, it was considered as the most suitable way for dealing with the Dutch armed forces whose aim was to take over Indonesia's centres of gravity by invading several important cities at the same time, including its capital. Politically, the wehrkreise was initially created by General Nasution to restore a sense of hierarchy within the Siliwangi Division. In other words, while it was employed as a measure to decentralise tactical decision-making, the wehrkreise was also instrumental to ensure that all units were organised under a unified command.

In reality, however, the wehrkreise strategy was not implemented in the battleground. Instead, a linear strategy was carried out where the majority of the force was placed at the fore front in order to buy a time for those at the hinder line evacuating civilians or burning down strategic facilities and vital objects to prevent them from falling into the enemy's control. Such strategy was deemed to fail, since in many fronts the Dutch army successfully rushed from unexpected direction, causing the deployment of a large chunk of the army in the fore front unavailing. The advancement of the Dutch aggression was unstoppable, and halted only when

some important regions were successfully occupied. But, then, the United Nations suggested the Indonesian government and the Dutch to resolve their conflict in diplomatic terms. Negotiations between the two parties eventually resulted in an armistice as a part of the Renville Agreement, signed in 17 January 1948.

The second Dutch 'police action' (the Dutch Military Aggression II), officially called Operation Crow, took place in 19–20 December 1948. Learning from the strategic failure during the event of the Dutch Military Aggression I, TNI returned to the wehrkreise strategy and made sure that the strategy was implemented rigorously. In some regions, the strategy was succeeded in halting, or at least slowing down, the movement of the Dutch army. Nevertheless, the Dutch army was superior to the Indonesian military by any means, especially in its weaponry and military vehicles. The momentum was also disadvantageous for Indonesia. Previously in the same year it also had to deal with the rebellion of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia [PKI]) in Madiun, East Java, erupted at 18 September 1948—later be known as the 'Madiun Affairs.' By the end of October 1948 TNI managed to retake the city. The operation to retake Madiun and quell the communist rebellion not only consumed a lot of resources but also disrupted TNI's concentration in preparing for the Dutch aggression.

Indonesian elite and military leadership realized that it was near to impossible to push back the Dutch by relying on the armed struggle. Thus, the real battle to win the war, for them, occurred not in the battlefield but in the negotiation table by the means of diplomacy. It was within this context that the so called the General Attack of 1 March 1949 (Serangan Umum 1 Maret 1949) gained its strategic significance. The attack was carried out in a well-orchestrated coordination with one objective: taking control over some vital facilities in Indonesia's capital at the time, Yogyakarta, from the Dutch for six hours and leaving before enemy's reinforcement arrives. In terms of military action, it was arguably not a success, since the enemy's force was not destroyed and the city of Yogyakarta was taken over for only a few hours. But it proved to be a decisive battle and resulted in diplomatic significance at least in three ways. Firstly, it proved that TNI was coordinated and organised military unit and not merely 'a group of security troublemaker' (gerombolan pengacau keamanan) as being labelled by the Dutch. Secondly, it boosted people's trust in the Indonesian army. Thirdly, its success in occupying Yogyakarta for several hours was a valuable momentum for Indonesian diplomatic struggle in international forums, for it proved that the Republic still existed at the time regardless the Dutch aggression.

The dynamics of the Indonesian independence war described above took place in the fragile and poorly defined territory of the new republic. As the successor state of the Dutch-Indies, Indonesia was entitled to the land occupied by its colonial government, stretching from Sabang in the northwest of the Sumatera Island to Merauke in the south-eastern corner of the Dutch-ruled western half of the New Guinea, regardless of the still underdeveloped colonial bureaucratic structure at the region. However, at the time following the 1945 independence proclamation Indonesian government was unable to effectively exercise its power over such a vast region. It was due to some factors. Firstly, for four years the Kingdom of the Netherlands didn't recognize Indonesia's independence. It even launched two 'police actions' to restore order in the colony during that period—perceived by Indonesians as attempts of re-colonisation. Consequently, during the period of Indonesian independence war a lot of regions were still contested between the Indonesian government and the Dutch. Secondly, the news of the independence proclamation was not travelled evenly throughout the archipelago. A lot of regions in Indonesia, especially those islands afar from Java and Sumatera, didn't aware of the independence until much later.

Moreover, due to the 1948 Renville Agreement between the Indonesian government and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the territory of the Republic of Indonesia was decimated. The Kingdom of the Netherlands, pursuant to the agreement, recognised the de facto authority of the Indonesian government only over some

parts of Sumatera and some parts of Java, including Yogyakarta. As the consequence, TNI's divisions in the West and East Java had to leave their post and migrated to Central Java. The event was known as 'the TNI's exodus' (TNI hijrah). It resulted in the upheavals in some regions, mostly by the armed groups disappointed with the Renville Agreement. The Madiun Affairs of 1948 previously mentioned and the rebellions of the Islamic state of Indonesia (Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia [DI/TII]) led by Kartosuwiryo in West Java were some of the notable cases.

Counter-Insurgencies and the Fragmented Geography during the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and the Parliamentary Democracy (1950–1959)

During the 1950s, Indonesia had to deal with regional upheavals and separatisms, particularly in West Java (APRA and DI/TII), South Sulawesi (Andi Azis and DI/TII), Maluku (RMS), as well as in Central Java, Aceh, and South Kalimantan (DI/TII). At the same time, it also suffered from political instability during the implementation of parliamentary democracy. Counter-insurgencies, therefore, dominated Indonesian military's tasks at the time. It was during this time that joint operation was introduced. Foreign-backed separatisms and rebellions, as well as the legacy of the Republic of the United State of Indonesia, caused Indonesian geography to be fragmented.

Following the event of the Dutch Military Aggression II, the Indonesian government engaged in diplomatic struggle to fight for international recognition of its independence. The struggle, supported by armed resistances against the two Dutch aggressions, proved to be fruitful when negotiation after negotiation led to the Round Table Conference between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia to be held in the Hague. A lengthy conference was held from 23 August to 2 November 1949, assisted by the United Nation Commission for Indonesia facilitating the delegations from the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Indonesia, and the Federal Consultative Assembly (representatives of several states created by the Dutch in Indonesian archipelago) to discuss the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch to the Indonesian government.

By the time the Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty was signed in 2 November 1949, the Netherlands Kingdom had formally recognised the independence of the Republic of Indonesia, yet with some conditions the Indonesian government had to agree upon. One of the points of the agreement was the formation of the United State of Indonesia (Republik Indonesia Serikat [RIS]), a federation comprises of the Republic of Indonesia and six other states (East Sumatera, South Sumatera, Pasundan, East Java, Madura, and East Indonesia) and several autonomous regions. Its entire territory covered all of the East Indies with the exclusion of the West Irian (West New Guinea). But, the federation lasted only for less than a year, since all of its constituents, viewing the concept of the federation as associated with colonialism, agreed to form a unitary state in 17 August 1950.

With regard to the military organization, the formation of RIS was followed by the inclusion of KNIL into the RIS's armed forces (Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Serikat [APRIS]) within which the TNI was the core component. This inclusion of KNIL resulted in in-disciplinary problems, even rebellious movements in some regions such as the coup d'état attempt of the Legion of Ratu Adil (Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil [APRA]) in Bandung, West Java, led by a former KNIL captain, Raymond Westerling and the 'Makassar Uprising' in Makassar, South Sulawesi, also led by a former KNIL captain, Andi Azis. At the same time, a separatist movement emerged in the Maluku islands of eastern Indonesia, namely the Republic of South Maluku (Republik Maluku Selatan [RMS]). It was defeated by military joint operation with the big help of the navy, led by Lieutenant Colonel A. E. Kawilarang who also led the crackdown of Andi Azis rebellion.

The dissolution of RIS into the unitary state of Indonesia further promoted the Indonesians' perception of the archipelago as a bounded geography should be governed as an integrated political entity. Subsequent to

the RIS dissolution, the new republic was governed under a parliamentary system within which the President serves as the head of the state while the Prime Minister takes the role of the head of the government. It was during this period when the Indonesian government made a historical declaration in 1957, later be known as the Juanda Declaration after the Prime Minister at the time, Juanda Kartawijaya. The declaration, positing Indonesia's unilateral claim of sovereignty over waters around and between islands in the archipelago, was a mile stone to the birth of the so called 'archipelago doctrine,' a political concept of archipelagic state which importantly contributes to the modern international law of the sea codified in the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) of 1982. The doctrine itself holds that 'all waters contained within the baselines drawn around the outer islands of a state which is entirely formed by one or more archipelagos [sic.] are the internal waters of that state and subject to its sovereignty.'

Djalal notices that the political decision to make the Juanda Declaration was encouraged by a dire need to secure Indonesian waters from foreign vessels, particularly that of the Dutch, in order to resolve 'the West Irian question' and to prevent 'foreign powers' from muddling with Indonesian unity. With regard to the later, Indonesia believed that some foreign secret operations contributed to the escalation of regional upheavals and separatisms, even though it was unsure about which foreign power was at play at the time. As a unilateral political statement, the Declaration itself had no legal effect but, still, it generated protests from France, the US, the UK, Australia, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Japan, while the Soviet Union and China, whose maritime interests in the region were limited at the time, supported the claim.

Djalal suggests that the importance of the 'Indonesian archipelago' concept at the time was mostly of symbolic value, exploited to ignite the spirit of nationalism and used as a tool of representation to enforce the sense of unity as a nation. Indonesian population is distributed over more than 13,000 islands that stretch over 3,000 miles from Sumatera in the west to the western New Guinea in the east. Thus, the sea constitutes 'an important element in the national consciousness of Indonesians,' for it links these thousands of islands to form a unitary geography.

By declaring its sovereignty over the waters, Indonesia sought for the unification of its territory, politically and legally, under a solid geography of thousands of interlocking islands. It is also crucial to the development of the concept of main islands defence (pertahanan pulau-pulau utama) as a part of Indonesian defence policy. Since 1950, Indonesian army was organised into seven divisions called Territory and the Troops (Teritorium dan Tentara [T & T]), each of which bounded to a defined region. The T & T system was dissolved in 1959 and was substituted with the establishment of Military Regional Command (Komando Daerah Militer [KDM and later, Kodam]).

During the 1957–1959 the seven T & Ts were gradually transformed into sixteen Kodams, including four Kodams in Sumatera, four in Java, three in Kalimantan, two in Sulawesi, one in Maluku, and one in Nusa Tenggara. In order to facilitate the coordination between Kodams in one main island outside of Java, the Inter-Regional Command (Komando Antar Daerah [Koanda]) was established, namely the Inter-Regional Command of Sumatera, Kalimantan, and Eastern Indonesia. In this organisation, Kodam serves as a region's strategic compartment (kompartemen strategis wilayah), while the main islands are defined as defence's primary regions (daerah pokok pertahanan) where a war of attrition would take place in the event of foreign invasion.

Djalal also notices that even though an explicative record was absent, but it was indicative that prior the 1957 Juanda Declaration the Indonesian military was the main supporter of the archipelago doctrine. The then naval chief, Colonel R. E. Martadinata, was even willing to go as far as assuming the chair of the Interdepartmental Committee to promote the idea of archipelagic state. One of his main reasons was to increase the budget allocation for the navy, should the Indonesian waters drastically increased by the

provision of the doctrine. Djalal argues that the strong support from the military to the archipelago doctrine rooted in the primacy of Indonesian unity in the military's view. In the past the view was manifested in their resentment toward the RIS's federal arrangement and the political instability during the parliamentary democracy.

Moreover, the doctrine contains a promising strategic value for Indonesian national security, since the control over waters was crucial in defending an archipelagic territory, especially considering that the success or failure of any military campaign in such geography will depend on maritime operation. The Indonesian government even decided to take a bold action in enforcing the Juanda Declaration with the enactment of the Act No. 4 of 1960 (PP 4/1960) concerning Indonesian Waters by including the West Irian in the Indonesian map. The act was followed by the 1962 Act of Innocent Passage. As such, Djalal observes that 'between 1957 and 1962, the "movement" factor seemed to be the most instrumental in shaping the government's formulation of maritime territorial policy.' It is important to understand the development within the context of the West Irian campaign to complete the geography of the Unitary State of Indonesia (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia [NKRI]). It was during the period of Guided Democracy that the Indonesian government produces those laws to effectively enact the doctrine.

The West Irian Liberation, Completing Indonesian Geography during the Guided Democracy (1959–1966)

In the early 1960s the problem of the West Irian was the Indonesian government's priority. During the campaign, Indonesia built up its military with the help of the Soviet Union and issued several laws and acts to regulate resources mobilisation to support the military joint operations. With the re-inclusion of the West Irian, therefore, Indonesian geography was completed, but it still lacked of integrity due to the existences of high seas separating its scattered islands.

Indonesia entered a new period called the Guided Democracy (Demokrasi Terpimpin) when President Sukarno issued a presidential decree in 5 July 1959 to dissolve the Constituent Body (Badan Konstituante), a high-level body tasked to create a new constitution, and restore the 1945 Constitution. The decree re-established the presidential system by ending the parliamentary cabinet and, consequently, emasculated the power of political parties in Indonesian politics. It was also during this period that Sukarno gradually directed Indonesia's international relation towards the communist bloc, especially the Soviet Union and China, despite the 'independent and active' principle of Indonesia's foreign policy demands that Indonesia will take no alignment with any major powers in pursuing an active role in international politics, especially during the Cold War situation at the time. Domestically, Sukarno nurtured a closer relationship with the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia [PKI]) since the early 1960s. Some argues that the move can be understood as Sukarno's 'balancing' attempt both in international stage and domestic politics.

In international stage, Sukarno's intimate relation with the communist China was a part of his anti-imperialist foreign policy constructed on his interpretation of the world situation in which the 'Newly Emerging Forces' or NEFO, consisted of Indonesia and other under-developed ex-colonial nations gaining independence after the World War II, contended to the 'Old Established Forces' or OLDEFO, generally consisted of Western colonialists/imperialists, including the US. In domestic politics, Sukarno's decision to embrace PKI into his circle can be understood as a strategic move for balancing the growing power of the military by mobilising mass politics. Indonesia's close relation with the Soviet Union was proved to be fruitful, for it provided Indonesia with an assistance to build up its military, especially in executing its campaign to liberate the West Irian from the Dutch's occupation. It was also the Soviet Union and China who supported the 1957 Juanda Declaration as a gesture of friendship, besides their own disinterest in securing the right of passage due to their relatively weak maritime forces at the time.

However, Sukarno's strategy to lean more towards communist party further antagonised his relation with the military. Indonesian military, especially the army, perceived communism (a foreign ideology) as a threat to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (considered as an Indonesian indigenous ideology), enforced by the living memory of their violent encounter during the Madiun Affairs in 1948. In 1962 Indonesian military consolidated itself by merging TNI and the Indonesian Police Force (Polri) to form the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia [ABRI]) as a means to prevent the infiltration of communist influence in the military circle, although it was only in early 1964 that the PKI began to be assertive in gaining more political power.

During the first half of the 1960s the political power relations, dominated by Sukarno on the one hand and the army on the other hand, were full of tension but none of the parties reckless enough to tip over the balance, creating a 'stable conflict' between the two. Sukarno was the most powerful figure, while the army was the most powerful institution, and they need each other to maintain their power. Despite the army's hostility towards the communists, it cannot be denied that the close relationship between Sukarno and the Soviet Union was instrumental for the success of some Indonesia's military agenda. In early 1960s Indonesia formed Theatre Command (Komando Mandala) to prepare an offensive to put an end to the Dutch's control over the West Irian. For this, Sukarno made a deal with the Soviet Union to procure a large number of arms and military vehicles, including dozens of warships. During the campaign in the West Irian, Indonesia deployed the majority of its military forces to besiege the region as the Dutch's last stand in Indonesia. The Theatre Command was designed as a joint command enforced by the army, the navy and the armed force.

The West Irian campaign, also known as the Trikora Operation, brought some strategy innovations to Indonesian doctrine of war of attrition (*perang berlarut*). Firstly, it introduced a staging of military operation orchestrated to execute an offensive that tends to rely on a conventional strategy. Indonesian military was previously used to guerrilla warfare organised through 'the military regions' (*wehrkreise*) and, at the time of quelling regional rebellions, counter-guerrilla strategy relying on 'territorial war' implemented through 'isolation war.' Secondly, a staging was also used to manage the sea and air operation to support the army. Thirdly, the campaign was supported with mechanisms of mobilisation set by several regulations issued between 1959 and 1962.

The Trikora Operation was successful and followed by the New York Agreement, signed by the Netherlands and Indonesia on 15 August 1962. Shortly after the agreement, a UN mission called the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) assumed temporary administration of the West Irian until the transfer of authority to the Republic of Indonesia taken place in 1 May 1963. Thus, the 1963 transfer of authority completed Indonesia's territory as the successor state of the Dutch Indies. It was apparent, then, that during the period of Guided Democracy the evolution of archipelago doctrine went hand-in-hand with anti-imperialism/anti-colonialism rhetoric, ultimately manifested in the liberation of the West Irian and its re-inclusion into the Republic of Indonesia. In the next period we will see how the archipelago doctrine and Indonesian defence policy co-evolve as a new drive present in the equation: resource interest and developmentalist agenda to optimize it.

Anti-Communist Campaign, Enforcing Indonesian Unity during the New Order (1966–1998)

During the early years of the New Order regime, communism was constructed as the main threat to Indonesian unity. After the anti-communist campaign was over in the early 1970s, the emphasis of the national unity was kept, but with the twist: serving the national development agenda. It was within this context that the military became one of the regime's main instruments to secure its power and interest. It was also during the course of the New Order that Indonesian status as archipelagic state was internationally recognised. For Indonesia, the codification of the concept of archipelagic state through the 1982 UNCLOS

facilitated its interests in maintaining national unity and securing the claim over the resources contained in its vast territory.

The rule of the New Order regime under Suharto span to three decades long. There were surely a lot of dynamics over such a long period. But in terms of Indonesian defence and its relation to the transformation of Indonesian territory into an archipelagic state, and also for a matter of simplicity, we can divide it into two phases. The first phase was the early years of the New Order, when Indonesia shifted dramatically from the hostility towards the West during the reign of President Sukarno to a far much friendly attitude. At this period, namely during the second half of the 1960s to the early 1970s, military operations to terminate the PKI and uproot communist ideology, movements, and institutions from Indonesian politics, triggered by the murder of some army's generals in 30 September–1 October 1965, became the main priority of the defence policy. At the broader geopolitical context, the operation occurred at the time when the proxy war between the liberal West and the communist East Bloc took place in Vietnam. The event paved the path for the rise of the New Order.

Besides the communists, other threats during the period included two separatist movements in the eastern- and westernmost provinces of Indonesia, Papua (then Irian Jaya) and Aceh, namely the Free Papua Organisation (Organisasi Papua Merdeka [OPM]) and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka [GAM]), founded in 1967 and 1977 respectively. Similar to the strategy employed in the 1950s to quell regional rebellions, Indonesian military also used counter-insurgencies measures relying on counter-guerrilla strategy in both regions. However, the military measures were proved to be unsuccessful to put an end to the separatist movements in Papua and Aceh. Instead of military measures, the Aceh problem was settled through an agreement between the Indonesian government and GAM, signed in Helsinki in 15 August 2005, encouraged by the urgent call to rebuild Aceh after it was devastated by the tsunami the previous year. As for Papua, the problem is still unresolved until now.

Back in 1967, shortly after he assumed control of the government, Suharto took no time to normalize the relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia previously severed by a five-year 'confrontation' led by Sukarno who perceived the formation of Malaysia as a prolongation of British imperialism in the region. As an effort to stabilize the Southeast Asia region, Indonesia with some of its closest neighbours, namely Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines, initiated the founding of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). The founding of ASEAN encouraged its members to settle every regional conflict between them within the frame of ASEAN facilitation, known as the 'ASEAN way,' since they recognise that regional conflicts which are not solved by powers within the region will be solved by powers from the outside the region. In order to draw its maritime border to be recognizable, as a part of its initiative to ensure the stability and friendly environment of Southeast Asia region, during 1970s Indonesia fixed its border agreement with six neighbouring countries—up to 1980, twelve treaties on border agreement were signed.

Once the regional stability and security maintained, the Suharto administration would be able to properly concentrate on the matter of domestic politics and national development agenda. It started the second phase of the New Order's rule, when the economic development became the main priority, while the social and political stability was placed as its primary prerequisite. The measures for maintaining domestic security dominated the army's tasks during this period. In several cases, the army was deployed to restore order when social unrest erupted in a region. The New Order also ubiquitously used intelligence operation to shun its critics and political challengers, for it demanded total obedience from the people to support the development agenda.

Along with the New Order's emphasis on the priority of national development, it seemed to be more interested in the archipelago doctrine than its predecessor. Djalal suggests that the different tendency

towards the doctrine was observable through the differences between Sukarno and Suharto in publicly addressing the issue. Despite of the Juanda Declaration and the enactment of two acts related to Indonesia's maritime territory during his presidency, Sukarno seemed to scarcely make a mention about it in his public speeches. On the contrary, Suharto seemed to like to address it whenever he gets a chance. The importance of the archipelago doctrine became more and more apparent along with the increasing symbolic, strategic and economic value of the Indonesian maritime territory. Symbolically, the doctrine redefines the seas between Indonesian islands from separator into connector and gave a sense of unity to the Indonesian territory as a complete whole. Strategically, it sets a stage for Indonesian military to make a presence as a most concrete manifestation of the Indonesia's sovereignty over the maritime territory, and at the same time denying the presence of foreign military vessels. Economically, the doctrine also facilitated the Indonesia's claim over the riches contained within the boundary of the maritime territory.

The economic value or 'resource factor' of the maritime territory was never established during the Sukarno's administration. But with the advance of the technology to exploit the riches of the maritime territory, especially the oil deposit under the seabed, the Suharto's administration sensed the urgency to assume its exclusive right and control over the maritime territory. Moreover, Indonesia needed to generate more revenues to stabilize the economy. Thus, when the lawyer Mochtar Kusumaadmadja returned from his self-imposed exile in the US, he suggested the government to follow the move of other countries in claiming the exclusive right to exploit whatever is underneath the seabed of their adjacent sea. The government then claimed the continental shelf adjacent to Indonesian coasts in 1969. Eventually, it will also declare the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in 1980 and enacted it through the Law No. 5 of 1983.

The resource-oriented regimes of maritime territory, particularly to facilitate the exploitation of the riches of the ocean and the seabed, developed along with the development of an internal doctrine called *Wawasan Nusantara* (Archipelagic Outlook). The doctrine is defined as 'the Indonesians' perspective on themselves and their environment by utilizing geographical conditions and constellations by creating responsibility, motivation, and stimulation for the entire Indonesian nation to achieve national goals.' Archipelagic Outlook was first established in military circle as a strategic doctrine in 1966–1967. Prior to that time, each of the three branches of military, the army, the navy, and the air force, had its own doctrine. In order to unify them, the New Order tried to fashion a new unifying doctrine through seminars held during 1966–1967. By the end of the 1967 seminar, Archipelagic Outlook as a new doctrine was born. The 'resource factor' can be identified in the formulation of the doctrine at the time, as the official document conveys that at the foreseeable future Indonesia practically and pragmatically focuses on the *Wawasan Bahari* (Maritime Outlook), defined as 'a view in which the use and control of the oceans is essential for the development of the welfare and glory of the state and nation without compromising the principle of anti-imperialism.'

Beside the doctrine of Archipelagic Outlook, an organisational adjustment was also carried out to further consolidate Indonesian military. In 1970 the Defence's Regional Commands (*Komando Wilayah Pertahanan [Kowilhan]*) were formed, consisting six regional commands concentrated on the main islands. In this system, all military branches including the Indonesian Police are put under the command of a Defence's Regional Commander (*Panglima Kowilhan*). In 1973 the six commands were simplified into only four regional commands, namely Kowilhan I for Sumatra and West Kalimantan, Kowilhan II for Java, Madura, and Nusa Tenggara, Kowilhan III for Sulawesi, South Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, and East Kalimantan, and Kowilhan IV for Maluku and Irian Jaya. But, the system eventually dissolved in 1985 due to its size of organisation that was considered to be too big and inefficient. Since 1985 on, the military organisation returns to the *Kodam* system in which every *Kodam* tasked to manage the defence of a determined area within the main islands.

Starting from the military circle, the doctrine of Archipelagic Outlook was spread to the bigger audience, and thanked to the systematic efforts by the government for its institutionalization, by the early of 1970s it transformed into a political concept that glues together the land, the waters, and the people of Indonesia. Archipelagic Outlook was codified through the People's Consultative Assembly's Decree No. IV of 1973. Indonesian elites see it as a political concept built upon territorial conception of archipelagic state. As a domestic political matter Archipelagic Outlook doesn't need external recognition, but the archipelagic state concept, as a matter of the international law of the sea, should obtain diplomatic and legal recognition. The line of thought justified the importance of the institutionalization and internalization of the Archipelagic Outlook, and at the same time, the diplomatic 'struggle' (perjuangan) of the Indonesian delegation in promoting the archipelagic state concept in international forums.

Indonesian struggle to obtain international recognition as an archipelagic state peaked in 1982 when the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) included the concept as the part of the law of the sea and subsequently codified it in the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC). The negotiation was settled by accommodating the demand of Indonesia and other 'archipelagic states' for recognition of their sovereignty over the waters between their islands as well as user countries' rights for navigation through the waters. With the codification of the archipelago doctrine in the LOSC, Indonesia's claim over the sea within the baseline drawn from the outer point on its outermost islands was recognized. Accordingly, it was a success for Indonesia in converting the status of such seas into its internal waters, eliminating the existence of several 'high seas' that separate Indonesian islands. As a compensation for the user countries navigating the waters, Indonesia has to provide Archipelagic Sea Lanes (ASL) for the use of international navigation. Thus, consultations with those countries were held during 1991 to 1996. As the result of the consultations, Indonesia provided three north-south ASL, despite of the proposal of the west-east lane passing through the Java Sea, offered by the US and Australia but were denied by Indonesia. In 1996 Indonesia submitted its ASL to the IMO for its acceptance in 1998.

The Suharto's regime was characterized by a strong developmentalism. The evolution of the archipelagic doctrine at the period was also defined by the trait. The emphasis on the national unity was politically geared to ensure the social and political stability, perceived as the main precondition for the economic development. The Indonesian military, which also strongly holds the primacy of the Indonesian unity even since in its earliest years, served as one of the regime's instrument to maintain the requisite stability.

Concluding Remarks

We have discussed how Indonesian defence strategy co-evolved with its geography both in the terms of its size of territory and politico-legal construct, beside the main threats it faced at a given period. In the early days of the Republic of Indonesia, namely during the period of Independence War (1945-1949), the wehrkreise were used to defend a scattered and poorly defined territory from the Dutch aggression. Indonesian military operations at the time were mostly defensive and relying on the guerrilla warfare. In the next period, namely during the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI) and the subsequent Parliamentary Democracy (1950-1959), regional insurgencies and separatisms were the main threat. Indonesia's claim over the waters in between its islands through the 1957 Djuanda Declaration was inseparable with the needs to fight those insurgencies and separatisms. However, it was only in the next period, namely during the Guided Democracy (1959-1966), that the claim was enforced with acts and laws, while the Indonesian territory was about to be completed through the West Irian campaign of 1961-1962. Indonesian territory as an archipelagic state—meaning it includes not only the land but also the inter-island waters—was internationally recognised in 1982, achieved through a long diplomatic struggle since the late 1960s supported by the institutionalisation of the Archipelagic Outlook during the 1970s.

As for the present day, Indonesia faces new threats as well as new regional and national strategic conditions differed from those it faced in the past. In the regional level, the rise of China and territorial disputes it brings in the South China Sea becomes the most prominent issue to be address in recent decade. China's manoeuvre has been triggering the US to intensify its presence in the Western Pacific. The most recent development of the US's response was its newly strategic cooperation with the UK and Australia in the form of military cooperation dubbed as the AUKUS pact. The political tension in the South China Sea has been heightened over time, while the relation between the US and China deteriorated rapidly.

However, even in the event of the worst scenario regarding the South China Sea, Indonesia's participation in the war is improbable, let alone the threat of foreign invasion to its territory. Nevertheless, should the two powers, China and the US, engage in the armed conflict in the South China Sea, it is probable that Indonesia's territory will be crossed by the fleet, especially the Australian-based US Alliance's. Such situation will bring a serious dilemma for Indonesia. Will the possibility push Indonesia to embrace the next transformation of its defence? And if it will be doing so, in what direction such transformation will be? In the time being, it will remain a matter of speculation. However, as we learned from the evolution of Indonesian defence discussed in this article, the politico-legal construction of its geography should be counted in determining the outcome.

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Disclosure statement

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